Chain assassinations in Afghanistan cannot be analyzed merely as unintended consequences of instability or sporadic political violence. At their core, these killings embody a distinct logic, strategic targeting, and structural continuity that together constitute an organized security–political project—one whose roots extend years into the past and which has now entered a new phase by crossing Afghanistan’s geographical borders.
The turning point of this trajectory can be traced to the assassination of Ahmad Shah Massoud. This killing was not only the physical elimination of a military–political leader, but also the beginning of a doctrine of systematically removing resistance leaders and restructuring power along ethnic–ideological monopolies. In the years that followed, particularly during the Republican era, the targeted assassinations of Northern Alliance leaders, field commanders, and influential political figures gradually evolved from a tactical tool into a permanent strategy.
Within this continuum, the assassination of Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani—former President of Afghanistan and head of the High Peace Council—stands as one of the most significant and symbolically charged links in the chain. Carried out under the guise of peace dialogue and within a framework of political trust-building, this assassination demonstrated that the project of physically eliminating anti-Taliban leaders had not ceased; rather, it had advanced into more complex and deceptive forms. Rabbani’s killing dealt a symbolic blow to the peace process, eroded national trust capital, and undermined the mediating role of moderate figures. It clearly revealed that for the Taliban and their allied networks, peace was never an objective in itself, but a tactical instrument for infiltration and targeted elimination.
What binds these assassinations into a coherent chain is the pattern of victim selection. The targets were predominantly leaders and figures from northern Afghanistan, largely belonging to the Tajik ethnic group and the Persian-speaking spectrum—individuals who either actively resisted Talibanization or symbolized its ideological opposition.
In this framework, assassination functions not merely as a means of physical elimination, but as part of a broader mechanism of ethnic–political engineering. Its purpose is to weaken the symbolic capital of resistance, create leadership vacuums, and ultimately pave the way for ideological homogenization of power. Substantial evidence suggests that this process was reinforced not only by external actors but also, in some instances, through infiltration and overlap with networks operating within the Republican system itself.
Simultaneously, the structural crises of the Republic—including widespread electoral fraud, systemic corruption, plunder of public resources, and the collapse of social trust—eroded the capacity for institutional resistance. As a result, a system that might have stood against the Taliban gradually deteriorated into a fragile structure that, at the moment of crisis, collapsed with little cohesion or defensive resolve.
Following the fall of the Republic, Afghanistan’s political landscape clearly split into two camps. On one side were figures and currents that either aligned with the Taliban or, at minimum, did not fundamentally oppose Taliban ideology. These actors remained inside the country and even played roles in the domestic and international legitimization of Taliban rule. On the other side were military personnel, commanders, and anti-Taliban political activists who were forced into exile and sought refuge in neighboring countries.
At this stage, the role of regional actors became increasingly pronounced. After the Taliban’s return to power, several countries—guided by calculations of security, economic, and intelligence interests—opted for pragmatic engagement with the group. Among them, the Islamic Republic of Iran occupies a pivotal position, situated at the intersection of regional conflicts, U.S. pressure, tensions with Israel, and Afghanistan’s complex geopolitical dynamics.
Iran’s strategic choice became evident when it transferred Afghanistan’s official diplomatic representation to the Taliban and initiated formal diplomatic relations with them. This move was not merely administrative; it constituted a political message directed at Afghan domestic actors, Taliban opponents, and the international community.
Within this context, the presence of former Afghan military personnel—particularly anti-Taliban commanders and forces—on Iranian soil became a sensitive security issue. Recent developments, including the twelve-day Iran–Israel war and heightened internal security concerns, prompted the Islamic Republic to adopt a policy of mass deportations. This policy was implemented without effective distinction between ordinary migrants and individuals facing serious security threats.
The consequences of this decision were particularly devastating for former Afghan military personnel. Numerous reports indicate that some deportees, after forced return, were identified, arrested, imprisoned, or deliberately assassinated by the Taliban. This reality effectively extended the chain of assassinations from within Afghanistan to beyond its borders.
Under these conditions, the Taliban—drawing on experience, networks, and assassination planning mechanisms developed during the Republican era—have facilitated the externalization of chain assassinations. The killing of Ikramuddin “Sareeh” must be analyzed within this framework. This incident signals a phased transfer of the project of physical elimination of opponents into migrant and exile environments—spaces once perceived as relatively safe but now marked by heightened vulnerability.
To date, the Taliban have managed to mitigate the political cost of these actions through reliance on regional lobbyists, the silence of certain actors, and the complexity of international geopolitical equations. However, this situation places the Islamic Republic of Iran before a serious test—one directly tied to its international credibility and its legal and political responsibility.
Two analytical scenarios emerge in this regard.
In the first scenario, if Iran—consciously or unconsciously—continues silence or opaque engagement with the Taliban regarding these assassinations, this would signal a devaluation of the security of political refugees and a disregard for human rights consequences. In such a case, Iranian territory would become an unsafe and high-risk environment for former Afghan military personnel, imposing heavy moral and legal responsibility on Tehran.
In the second scenario, if Iran considers itself uninvolved in these assassinations, it must, in order to preserve its international standing, legal legitimacy, and regional position, initiate transparent, independent, and serious investigations. In an era of surveillance technologies, digital data, and advanced security systems, uncovering assassination networks is not unattainable—provided political will exists.
The fundamental point is that Iran must acknowledge that the roots of assassinations targeting figures from northern Afghanistan—particularly Tajiks and Persian speakers—are historical, identity-based, and ethno-political in nature. These roots began with the assassination of Ahmad Shah Massoud, were consolidated with the killing of Burhanuddin Rabbani, and, following the regime change in Afghanistan, have not disappeared but have instead been reproduced.
Ignoring this reality will not only cloud the future of Iran–Afghanistan relations, but will also expose Iran’s foreign policy to structural distrust in regional and global public opinion. The continuation of this trend will seriously and long-term undermine processes of trust-building, normalization of relations, and Iran’s social and diplomatic engagement with other states.
Ultimately, chain assassinations will only cease when, instead of politically managing the crisis, their ideological, ethnic, and intelligence-based roots are transparently and responsibly examined. Otherwise, this project will continue to reproduce itself—both inside Afghanistan and beyond its borders.
Benazir Samim
Member of the Leadership Committee
Afghanistan Justice Women’s Movement
